20 iunie 1975 - pentru prima dată de la instaurarea regimului comunist o navă militară americană intra în Portul Constanța

În data de 20 iunie 1975, pentru prima dată  de la instaurarea regimului comunist o navă militară americană intra în Portul Constanța. Este vorba de fregata purtătoare de rachete U.S.S. WAINWRIGHT.

sursă foto: historicimages.com

Din telegramele wikileaks aflăm și ce decizii au luat americanii în urma acestei vizite.

 1. SUMMARY: WE HAVE MADE A SUCCESSFUL BEGINNING IN MILITARY

EXCHANGES WITH ROMANIA THROUGH THE COMAN VISIT TO THE U.S. (MARCH 1975), THE USS WAINWRIGHT'S PORT CALL AT CONSTANTA (JUNE 75), AND GENERAL WEYAND'S RECENT RETURN OF THE COMAN VISIT (SEPT 75). THIS MESSAGE DISCUSSES WHY AND HOW THIS MOMENTUM SHOULD BE SUSTAINED, AND PROPOSES A DELIBERATE, PACED AND VARIED PROGRAM FOR IMPLEMENTATION OVER THE MEDIUM-TERM. WE TREAT HERE ONLY EXCHANGES AND LEAVE OTHER ASPECTS OF POTENTIAL MILITARY RELATIONS FOR SEPARATE CON- SIDERATION. END SUMMARY. CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 BUCHAR 05014 01 OF 02 031034Z 2. FURTHER EXCHANGES WITH ROMANIA SHOULD BE PLANNED IN THE MILITARY SPHERE TO SUSTAIN THE FAVORABLE MOMENTUM GENERATED BY THE COMAN VISIT TO THE U.S. (MARCH 75), THE USS WAINWRIGHT'S VISIT TO ROMANIA (JUNE 75), AND GENERAL WEYAND'S RECENT RETURN OF THE COMAN VISIT (SEPT 75). 3. BACKGROUND. MILITARY EXCHANGES WITH ROMANIA SERVE THE NATIONAL INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES ON SEVERAL COUNTS. FIRST, WE KNOW COMPARATIVELY LITTLE ABOUT THE ROMANIAN MILITARY; THE EXPANSION OF CONTACTS CAN THROW ADDITIONAL LIGHT ON CAPABILITIES AND ATTITUDES OF THIS DEFENSE FORCE OF A RELUCTANT WARSAW PACT MEMBER. WE CAN ALSO EXPECT TO GAIN AT LEAST SOME NEW INSIGHTS INTO THE RELATIONSHIPS AND ORAGANIZATION WITHIN THE PACT ITSELF. FURTHER, THE ROMANIAN MILITARY IS A KEY COMPONENT OF CEAUSESCU'S HIGHLY AUTHORITARIAN, DISCIPLINED STATE STRUCTURE; HE HAS COME TO RELY INCREASINGLY ON THE ARMY IN MAJOR CIVIL AND ECONOMIC PROJECTS AS WELL AS FOR DEFENSE. THE MILITARY IS LIKELY TO BECOME EVEN MORE IMPORTANT IN THE FUTURE AS VITAL UNDER- PINNING TO BOTH ROMANIA'S INDIVIDUALISTIC FOREIGN POLICY LINE AND HER DOMESTIC STABILITY. 4. POLICY. BROADENING FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH A GROUP WHICH, UNDER PARTY GUIDANCE, HAS STUBBORNLY RESISTED SOVIETS' ATTEMPTS TO FURTHER COORDINATE AND REGIMENT MILI- TARILY THE EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES DOVETAILS WITH ANY ANTI-"BREZHNEV DOCTRINE" POLICY FOR EAST EUROPE, PARTICU- LARLY IN THE POST-CSCE PERIOD. THE ROMANIAN MILITARY WILL BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE BALKAN STABILITY EQUATION AS WE CONTINUE OUR POLICY OF ENCOURAGING YUGOSLAV AND ROMANIAN INDEPENDENCE TO OFFSET POTENTIALLY DESTABIL- IZING SOVIET HEGEMONIC PRESSURES IN THIS UNCERTAIN REGION. MOREOVER, OUR ESTABLISHED BILATERAL POLICY TOWARD ROMANIA IS TO PROMOTE AND WHEREEVER PBYSIBLE INSTITUTIONALIZE LINKS BETWEEN ALL KEY ELITE SEGMENTS AND THEIR AMERICAN COUNTER- PARTS, ENABLING A MORE NORMAL, SELF-SUPPORTIVE INTERCHANGE TO TAKE PLACE AND DEMONSTRATING TO OTHER COUNTRIES THE ADVANTAGES FLOWING FROM ORE RELAXED EAST-WEST TIES. THUS, THE TIME SEEMS RIPE TO BRING OUR MILITARY CONTACTS WITH THE ROMANIANS MORE NEARLY ABREAST OF ALREADY WELL-ADVANCE TIES IN THE ECONOMIC, CULTURAL, SCIENTIFIC AND OTHER SPHERES. CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 BUCHAR 05014 01 OF 02 031034Z FINALLY, AS WE MOVE AHEAD VIA DETENTE WITH CERTAIN OTHER EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, MILITARY EXCHANGES OFFER ONE USEFUL WAY TO KEEP ROMANIA SOMEWHAT AHEAD OF THEM --WHICH IS ALSO ESTAB- LISHED POLICY. 5. ALTHOUGH SOVIET SUSPICISONS ARE PREDICTABLE, GIVEN THEIR EXCLUSIVIST INTERPRETATION OF DETENTE, US/ROMANIAN MILITARY EXCHANGES FIT INTO THE FRAMEWORK OF MILITARY DETENTE WHICH THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES HAVE ADVOCATED SINCE HELSINKI. THE GOR, FOR ITS PART, HAS SHOWN NO CONCERN WHATEVER THAT AN AUGMENTED PROGRAM OF US/ROMANIAN MILITARY CONTACTS WOULD BE PROVOCATIVE OR SIGNIFICANTLY DISTURBING TO THE KREMLIN. 6. FURTHER MOVMENT IN THE MILITARY EXCHANGE ARENA SHOULD BE DELIBERATELY PACED, WITH DUE REGARD FOR WHAT NATO ALLIES ARE DOING. WE SHOULD NEITHER OUTPACE THEM NOR LAG TOO FAR BEHIND. CONSEQUENTLY, IN CONCERT WITH U.S. POLICY OB- JECTIVES REGARDING ROMANIA AS WELL AS THE POSSIBLE SALU- TARY SIDE EFFECTS THEY MAY HAVE ON OTHER WP COUNTRIES, THE FOLLOWING MILITARY EXCHANGES/INVITATIONS ARE PROPOSED BEYOND THE GENERAL TUTOVEANU AND OPSAIL VISITS ALREADY SCHEDULED: A. FIRST, WE RECOMMEND PRIORITY CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO THE SHORT-TERM EXCHANGE OF OBSERVER DELEGATIONS IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS: 1. MILITARY MAINTENANCE SCHOOLS. 2. QUARTERMASTER FOOD SERVICE SCHOOLS. 3. DEFENSE LANGUAGE TRAINING FACIL IES. 4. PARATROOPER AND RANGER TRAINING FACILITIES. THESE COULD GO IN PARALLEL TO WHATEVER FURTHER HIGH-LEVEL VISITS MAY BE CONDUCTED. THEIR PURPOSE WOULD BE TO ENCOURAGE MILITARY DETENTE AND ROMANIAN INDEPENDENCE AMONG MILITARY WORK- ING LEVELS HERETOFORE VERY ISOLATED FROM OUTSIDE INFLUENCE. B. SECOND, IT WOULD BE LOGICAL TO EXTEND INVITATION TO THE COMMANDER OF THE ROMANIAN AIR FORCE, POSSIBLY IN THE TIME FRAME OF EARLY OR MID-1976. AFTER THE USSS WAINWRIGHT VISIT, ROMANIAN MILITARY, INCLUDING THE COMMANDER OF ROMAF, OPENLY STATED THAT IT WAS NOW TIME FOR US/ROMANIAN AIR FORCE EXCHANGE VISITS. THIS VISILYWOULD BRING THESUROGRAM INTO SERVICE CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 BUCHAR 05014 01 OF 02 031034Z BALANCE AND PROVIDE CREDITS AT THIS END. CONFIDENTIAL NNN CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 01 BUCHAR 05014 02 OF 02 031039Z 12 ACTION EUR-12 INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 ACDA-05 DIWY-01 CU-02 EB-07 COME-00 TRSE-00 XMB-02 OMB-01 /077 W --------------------- 109584 P R 030945Z OCT 75 FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4892 INFO CNO WASHDC CSA WASHDC CSA WASHDC CSAF WASHDC DIA WASHDC JCS WASHDC OSD/ISA WASHDC USMISSION NATO C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BUCHAREST 5014 C. THIRD, AN ANNUAL U.S. NAVAL SHIP VISIT TO CONSTANTA SHOULD BE PROGRAMMED, NOW THAT THE USS WAINWRIGHT HAS BROKEN THE ICE. THIS WOULD BE ALONG THE LINES OF THE PROGRAMS NOW EXISITING FOR YUGOSLAVIA. D. FOURTH, THIS BEING INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S YEAR, AN INVITATION TO A ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES WOMEN'S GROUP TO VISIT THEIR U.S. COUNTERPARTS (ARMY, NAVY, AF) WOULD BE IN ORDER. THIS POSSIBILITY COULD BE BROACHED ANY TIME AFTER THE OCT 75 VISIT OF GENERAL TUTOVEANU. E. FIFTH, MILITARY ACADEMY STUDENT VISITS TO U.S. MILITARY ACADEMIES OR SENIOR SERVICE SCHOOLS WOULD BE A LOGICAL CONTIN- UATION OF PREVIOUS VISITS TO ROMANIA BY NWC AND ICAF STUDENTS. F. SIXTH, PRE-MILITARY STUDENT VISITS BY U.S. HIGH SCHOOL CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 BUCHAR 05014 02 OF 02 031039Z ROTC LEVEL WITH ROMANIAN MILITARY LYCEUM COUNTERPARTS. SUCH EXCHANGES COULD FOSTER POSITIVE UNDERSTANDINGS AMONG THESE FUTURE ROMANIAN OFFICERS. G. SEVENTH, THE ROMANIANS ARE CLEARLY EAGER TO MOVE AHEAD QUICKLY WITH EXCHANGE OF VISITS OF MINISTER OF DEFENSE. SECRETARY SCHLESINGER HAS BEEN INVITED TO ROMANIA (SECTO 14017), AND GENERAL IONITA, ROMANIAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE HINTED DURING HIS DISCUSSION WITH GENERAL WEYAND THAT HE WOULD BE AMENABLE TO AN INVITATION TO VISIT THE U.S. (WITH THE PAST YEAR, IONITA HAS OFFICIALLY VISITED FRANCE, AUSTRIA, AND MEXICO. HE WILL ALSO VISIT THE SOVIET UNION IN NOV 1975, AND GREAT BRITAIN IN EARLY 1976.) WE RECOMMEND THAT THE INVITATION TO SECRETARY SCHLESINGER FOLLOW BY SOME INTERVAL THE VISIT OF ROMANIA'S AIR FORCE CHIEF TO THE U.S., UNLESS SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S OWN TRAVEL PLANS WOULD BRING HIM EARLIER TO YUGOSLAVIA IN WHICH CASE A VISIT TO ROMANIA COULD ALSO BE ADDED. IF A VISIT DOES NOT LOOK POSSIBLE FOR 1976, THEN WE SHOULD CONSIDER INVITING IONITA TO THE U.S. IN LATE 1976 OR IN 1977. 7. ACTION REQUESTED: A. THAT INVITATIONS BE ISSUED AS OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPHS 5B AND D ABOVE; B. THAT THE OTHER SUGGESTED PROPOSALS OR EXCHANGES BE STUDIED FOR FEASIBILITY AND TIMING. BARNES CONFIDENTIAL NNN

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